The Supreme Court/The Supreme Court.iso/pc/ascii/1991/91_1550/91_1550.za

Text File | 1992-05-31 | 3.3 KB | 66 lines

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
THOMAS McCLEARY v. JOSE G. NAVARRO et ux.
on petition for writ of certiorari to the united
states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
No. 91-1550.  Decided June 1, 1992

  The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

  Justice White, with whom The Chief Justice, Justice
O'Connor and Justice Thomas join, dissenting.
  Respondents filed this lawsuit after police, who were
attempting to execute a search warrant, began kicking at
their door at 11 o'clock one night.  The police were looking
for a suspected cocaine dealer, but they got the wrong
house.  The question presented is whether petitioner, the
officer who drafted the search warrant affidavit describing
the house to be searched, is entitled to qualified immunity.
Because the Court of Appeals applied the wrong legal
standard in answering that question, I would reverse and
remand for further consideration.
  Petitioner, a detective, received a tip from a confidential
informant that one Andres Villa had drugs in his home, one
of several small houses on an access road to a plant.  The
first building was set back from the road, along a separate
driveway.  The informant did not count this structure when
he told petitioner that Villa lived in the second house on the
right.  Consequently, the warrant that petitioner obtained
directed officers to go to the second house on the right.  The
officers executing the warrant counted differently, so they
ended up at the wrong house.
  Respondents sued petitioner and others not party to this
petition under 42 U. S. C. 1983, alleging a violation of
their Fourth Amendment rights.  The District Court denied
petitioner's motion for summary judgment on grounds of
qualified immunity.  The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding
-that the question in this case is whether a police officer in
[petitioner's] position would reasonably have described the
location with sufficient particularity to direct those execut-
ing the warrant to the correct house on the right- and -that
it is for the jury to decide whether [petitioner] acted
reasonably . . . .-  Navarro v. Barthel, 952 F. 2d 331, 333
(1991) (per curiam).
  The decision of the Court of Appeals was entered just a
few days after our judgment in Hunter v. Bryant, ___ U. S.
___, ___ (1991), in which we explained that the appropriate
inquiry was whether a reasonable officer could have
thought that he had acted in accordance with the Constitu-
tion, and not whether an officer would have acted otherwise
(the standard applied by Ninth Circuit in Hunter and the
present case).  This distinction provides -ample room for
mistaken judgments,- because qualified immunity protects
-all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law.-  Malley v. Briggs, 475 U. S. 335, 343, 341
(1986), quoted in Hunter, supra, at ___.
  In Hunter we also reiterated the principle that questions
of immunity ordinarily should be decided by the court, not
by the jury, id., at ___, because -[t]he entitlement is an
immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.-
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U. S. 511, 526 (1985).  See Hunter,
supra, at ___ (collecting cases).
  Because the Court of Appeals did not have the benefit of
our decision in Hunter when it was deciding this case, I
would summarily reverse and remand so the Ninth Circuit
may reexamine its decision in light of the correct legal
standards.